Qubic Wallet Hack: How 1,404 Wallets Were Emptied in Under 2 Hours
A thief emptied 1,404 Qubic wallets on October 18, 2026 (UK time) without phishing anyone. How weak randomness exposed seeds, the theories, and what to check.

Key takeaways
- A seed phrase is only as strong as the random number generator that created it. Keeping it secret does not help if it was guessable from the start.
- Qubic said these seeds had insufficient randomness: seeds made on an iPhone or iPad in any browser, or on a Mac in Safari, before October 18, 2026, and seeds made in its iPhone app before July 2025.
- Qubic told anyone who made a seed on its web wallet before the fix to treat it as insecure and move funds, even if nothing was taken.
- Qubic has set May 1, 2027 as the deadline for affected holders to claim recovered coins.
- The video says Qubic warned that nobody from Qubic will message you first or ask for your seed. Ignore anyone offering to get stolen coins back.
A thief emptied 1,404 Qubic wallets in about an hour and 44 minutes in the early hours of October 18, 2026, UK time, taking nearly 3 trillion Qubic coins worth roughly $1.3 million. Nobody was phished and no passwords were stolen. Qubic said the affected seeds were created with insufficient randomness, which made them guessable.
This matters beyond Qubic. The victims kept their seeds private and did nothing wrong. Their wallets were weak from the moment code they never saw created them. Qubic then halted its whole blockchain to stop the stolen coins moving, and later began returning most of them. That raises two questions for any holder: how were your wallets made, and who can pause the network you use?
What happened in the Qubic wallet hack?
The Qubic hack began at 12:42 a.m. UK time on October 18, 2026 and stopped at 2:26 a.m., according to the video. In that window, 1,404 wallets were emptied. Then the activity stopped.
Qubic is a blockchain started by Sergey Ivancheglo, known online as “Come-from-Beyond”, who co-founded IOTA. Qubic drew attention in August 2025 when it said it controlled more than half of Monero’s mining, and Monero had six of its blocks rewritten. Qubic is run by 676 operators it calls Computors.
The coin count sounds large, but one Qubic coin is worth a tiny fraction of a cent. A holder cited in the video said he lost about 24 billion Qubic, roughly $10,000, and that it was sent to the MEXC exchange. A chart watcher cited in the video had Qubic down about 40% from its October high on October 18, at about 45 cents per million coins.
What clues point to how the thief got in?
The timing points to a prepared list. Emptying 1,404 wallets in an hour and 44 minutes works out to about 4.5 seconds per wallet. The video argues that nobody guesses seeds at that speed, so the attacker probably knew which wallets to try before starting.
The flow of funds is the second clue. About 87% of the stolen coins never left the Qubic network. The other 13% went to MEXC, which, according to the video, froze the receiving account within about an hour. If that exchange account is tied to a real person, it is the obvious lead for investigators. Nobody has been named.
The third clue is the list of affected wallets. Qubic said these seeds were at risk:
- Seeds made on an iPhone or iPad, in any browser, before October 18, 2026.
- Seeds made on a Mac using Safari, before October 18, 2026.
- Seeds made in Qubic’s own iPhone app before July 2025.
That pattern is not random. It points to how certain devices and software generated the seeds.
Why does randomness matter for a seed phrase?
A seed phrase is the secret that controls a crypto wallet, and its security depends on nobody being able to guess it. Anyone who has the seed has the coins. For background, see our explainer on what a seed phrase is and how to store it.
Computers are poor at true randomness. When a program asks for a “random” number, it often just runs a calculation. If someone knows the calculation and its starting point, they can predict what comes next. The video shows a security YouTuber, PwnFunction, predicting his browser’s random numbers before asking for them. He explains that these generators are fine for jobs like shuffling a playlist. They are not meant for cryptography, because under some conditions they are predictable.
Qubic described the affected seeds as having “insufficient randomness”. The video compares this to a padlock that should have billions of combinations but actually had far fewer, so the thief had time to try them all.
What did SlowMist find in Qubic’s wallet code?
Security firm SlowMist reviewed Qubic’s wallet code and said it used a basic random function, Math.random, for two jobs. One was generating people’s seeds. The other was adding small numbers to wallet messages that anyone watching the network traffic could see. The video dates SlowMist’s report to October 20.
SlowMist’s theory is that an observer who saw six of those messages in a row could work back to the generator’s starting point, rebuild a seed and take the coins. SlowMist called this a hypothesized attack. It showed the attack could work in a test, but said whether it works in practice depends on who can actually see that traffic. It is a theory, not a finding about this specific theft.
Has this flaw happened before?
Yes. Coldcard, a Bitcoin hardware wallet, was hit by a similar flaw from July 30, 2026. A tech YouTube channel quoted in the video explained that a properly generated seed has 128 bits of entropy. That is enough that guessing it would take longer than the life of the universe.
According to that channel, Coldcard’s device had not been using its proper random number generator for about five years. The channel says it used the chip serial number and a timer instead. Both are predictable, so attackers could loop through every combination.
The channel put the losses at around $100 million in Bitcoin from more than 7,000 wallets. Published reports give different figures. BleepingComputer reported about $88.6 million taken from 4,585 addresses in early August 2026. Blockchain analytics firm TRM Labs later estimated the losses at $116 million.
For other incidents from the same period, see our roundup of third-quarter 2026 crypto hacks. The lesson the video draws is that the quality of the randomness matters more than the device it runs on.
Who are the suspects?
Nobody has been named. The video describes three explanations that are circulating:
| Theory | Who backs it | How it fits the evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Lone cracker | Qubic’s own account | Weak seeds, a worked-out method and a list run in under 2 hours. Fits the timing and the Apple-device pattern. |
| The listener | SlowMist’s theory | Someone watches wallet messages to rebuild seeds. Shown to work in a test, not shown in this case. |
| Inside job | A few posts on X | The video found no evidence for it and calls it gossip. |
According to the video, Ivancheglo posted on October 19 that it was just a problem with the random number generator in a wallet, and that such things happen in crypto daily. The video notes that this framing may sit poorly with people who lost money.
Why did Qubic freeze its blockchain?
Qubic’s Computors halted the entire blockchain to stop the thief cashing out. Nothing moved for anyone. The video says that while the chain was frozen, coins that had not left Qubic were moved into a “lock box” for their owners.
The chain resumed on October 19. On October 20, Qubic said the Computors had approved the recovery and the first coins had been returned. Qubic has set May 1, 2027 as the deadline for affected holders to claim.
Not everyone saw this as a clean win. News site CriptoNoticias argued that the episode showed the 676 validators decide what happens to people’s money, with victims waiting on their permission. The video takes a balanced view. Qubic recovered most of the funds, but a chain that can stop to catch a thief can stop for other reasons too. Holders of any coin can ask who has that power on their network.
What we know and what we don’t
Confirmed by Qubic: 1,404 wallets, about an hour and 44 minutes, weak randomness, and a fix, which is web wallet version 4.26.4. Qubic has also told anyone who made a seed on its web wallet before the fix to treat it as insecure, even if nothing was taken. Many holders now need to create new wallets and move their funds.
Unknown: who the thief is, exactly how the seeds were found, and who controls the MEXC account. The video says Qubic has promised a full technical report.
The video also warns of a second wave of theft. It says Qubic warned that nobody from Qubic will message you first or ask for your seed. According to the video, fake recovery services appeared within hours, targeting people who had already lost money. Our guide to spotting crypto recovery scams explains how they work.
Three questions to ask about every wallet you hold
The video offers a simple framework. For each wallet you own, ask:
- What made it? A hardware device, a phone app, or a page in a web browser?
- When did you make it? Flaws often affect wallets created within a specific window.
- Has the maker ever warned about how its wallets were made? Check the official site and announcements.
If the maker tells you to create a new wallet, do it from the real app, never from a link someone sent you.
What to watch next
Watch for Qubic’s technical report, which should show whether the lone-cracker or listener explanation holds up. If you hold Qubic and were affected, note the May 1, 2027 claim deadline. If you made a seed on Qubic’s web wallet before the fix, Qubic’s guidance is to treat it as insecure and move funds to a new wallet. For every other coin, check how your wallets were created and find out who has the power to pause the network you rely on.
Frequently asked questions
How were 1,404 Qubic wallets hacked?
Qubic said the affected seeds were created with insufficient randomness, which made them guessable. Nobody was phished and no passwords were handed over. The thief emptied 1,404 wallets in about an hour and 44 minutes in the early hours of October 18, 2026, UK time.
Which Qubic wallets were at risk?
According to Qubic's list, as reported in the video, three groups were at risk. The first is seeds made on an iPhone or iPad in any browser before October 18, 2026. The second is seeds made on a Mac using Safari before that date. The third is seeds made in Qubic's own iPhone app before July 2025.
How much was stolen in the Qubic hack?
The thief took nearly 3 trillion Qubic coins, worth roughly $1.3 million. About 87% never left the Qubic network and about 13% went to the MEXC exchange. According to the video, MEXC froze the receiving account within about an hour.
Can Qubic hack victims get their coins back?
Partly. Qubic halted its blockchain, and the chain resumed on October 19. On October 20 Qubic said the recovery had been approved and the first coins had been returned. Affected holders have until May 1, 2027 to claim.
Who hacked Qubic?
Nobody has been named. The video describes three theories: a lone attacker who worked out how the weak seeds were made, SlowMist's theory that someone watched wallet messages, and an inside-job claim with no evidence behind it. The video says Qubic has promised a full technical report.
Full video transcript
From the video's captions, lightly formatted. Captions can mishear names and numbers, so check figures against the article above.
Right, bull runners. At 18 minutes to 1 in the morning, UK time, on the 18th of October, 2026, somebody started opening other people's crypto wallets. By 26 minutes past 2, they'd empty 1,404 wallets, and then they just stopped. So, Qubic holders, someone emptied 1,404 wallets in under 2 hours. And here are the clues.
And if you own Qubic, your seed may be guessable if you made it in an iPhone browser, and I'll show you what. And attention crypto holders, because a thief drained 1,404 wallets, then the whole blockchain froze on purpose. The thief took nearly 3 trillion Qubic coins, which sounds like a heist of the century, until you hear one coin's worth a tiny fraction of a cent. So, in real money, it was about 1.3 million dollars. And here's what makes it a proper mystery.
Nobody got fished, and nobody handed over a password. And there's a link first in the description that I'll come back to once we've cracked this, because for a lot of people with serious money in crypto, it's where someone finally went over their setup with them. I'm Rory, by the way. I've been trading crypto and forex since 2020, and it's given me a full-time income and the freedom to travel the world while I do it. And by the end of this, you'll know how the thief got in without a single password, who the three suspects are, and the three questions I'd ask about every wallet you've ever made.
So, who's a victim? Qubic blockchain started by Sergey Ivancheglo, who goes by "Come from Beyond" online, and co-founded IOTA years back. And if Qubic rings a bell, it's probably because in August 2025, it said it controlled more than half of Monero's mining. And Monero had six of its blocks rewritten. It's run by 676 operators it calls computers.
And here's a detail I love. On the afternoon of the 17th of October, Qubic posts a thread about blockchains being kept safe by machine solving puzzles. About 8 hours later, somebody solved a very different puzzle. One holder posted that he lost about 24 billion Qubic, roughly $10,000 worth, and that it went off to an exchange called MEXC. And he said he'd been their biggest supporter from day one.
So, the first clue is a clock, and have a guess with me here. 1,404 wallets in an hour and 44 minutes. How many seconds is that for each wallet? Have a think. Well, it works out at about 4 and 1/2 seconds each, which is mad because nobody guesses at that speed.
To me, that sounds like a list. Like, whoever this was probably knew which doors to try before they started. And then look where the coins went. About 87% never left the Qubic network at all. The other 13% went to MEXC, and MEXC froze the account that received it within about an hour.
So, either our thief made one daft mistake, or they were in a hurry. And if that exchange account's tied to a real person, that's the first thread anyone investigating will pull. But nobody's been named, and I'm not naming anyone, either. Like, if you're bullish, let's run it.
[music]
Hey, bull runners, welcome back. So, the second clue is the strangest. Qubic put out a list of whose wallets were at risk, and it isn't random at all. It seeds made on an iPhone or an iPad in any browser before the 18th of October. Seeds made on a Mac using Safari, and seeds made in Qubic's own iPhone app before July 2025.
So, quick one. Hang on. What's a seed? Well, it's a secret string that basically is your wallet, and if someone has it, they've got your coins. The The point is it's picked so randomly, nobody could ever guess it.
Qubit said these seeds were made with their own words insufficient randomness. So, think of a padlock that's meant to have billions of combinations, but this one had far fewer and the thief had time to try them all. Computers are rubbish at being random. When a computer picks a random number, it's really doing a sum. And if you know that sum and where it started, you can work out what's coming next.
A security YouTuber called PWN function runs a little script and it tells him his web browser's random numbers before he asked for them.
Let's run the math random again. And if you look closely, it's the same number. If I run it again, bam, it's the same one. I run it again, bam, same one. I run it again, bam, okay, you get the idea.
I can predict random numbers. Pretty cool, right?
Same number every time. That's fine for shuffling your playlist, but it's not fine for making the keys to your money. And that's what gets me because those 1,400 people didn't do anything wrong. They didn't click a dodgy link. They made a wallet the way they were shown on the phone in their pocket and a bit of code they never saw decided whether their lock was real.
And if you've ever lain awake wondering whether you've set something up wrong without knowing it, you're in very good company. That's exactly why I want someone who really knows his stuff to go over my setup. I've done seriously well in crypto in my own right and I came through 2022, but what properly sped things up for me was the team we built at Altcoin Pro. Am I telling you to buy Qubit? No.
There may be better opportunities for your situation. But if you've got real money in crypto, you'd want to know how each of your wallets was made, where everything sits and whether the crypto you already hold could be put to work instead of just sitting there. So, go to the first link in the description and you'll find a short video. Watch that, tap the button under it, fill in the short form and book your free 15-minute call. And someone on the team will go through what you actually hold with you.
And if you're watching on your phone, tap more under this video and you'll find the link first in the list. It's for people holding $50,000 or more in crypto that's just sitting there. And if you're already well set up, they'll tell you that, too. And Black Friday's on the 27th of November when loads of us buy a new phone or a new gadget and set up fresh wallets on it. So, I'd get your call booked before then.
So, back to the case because on the 20th of October, a security firm called SlowMist went through Cubits wallet's code. They said it used a basic random marker called math.random. The kind you just saw get predicted for two jobs at once. One was making people's seeds. The other was stamping little numbers onto wallet messages.
Numbers that anyone watching that traffic could see. Their theory is that if you watch six of those messages in a row, you could work back to where the random marker started, rebuild someone's seed and take their coins. So, it's like a safe that whispers its combination every time someone walks past. But SlowMist were careful. They called it a hypothesized attack, proved it could work in a test and said whether it works for real depends on who can actually see that traffic.
So, that's a theory, not a verdict. And PWM function put the rule really simply.
What these aren't used for is cryptography because pseudo random number generators under conditions are predictable and predictability isn't appreciated in the field of cryptography.
Predictability isn't appreciated in cryptography, which is a very polite way of saying it gets you robbed. From the 30th of July 2026, the same kind of flaw hit Coldcard, a hardware wallet sold to some of the most careful Bitcoin holders on the planet. And Farship, a big tech channel, explained why randomness is everything.
Since the entire security model depends on those words being unguessable, they're chosen by your wallet using a random number generator. A properly generated seed phrase has 128 bits of entropy, which means if you try a billion guesses per second, the universe would end before you got close.
The universe would end before you got close. That's the theory. But Farship said Coldcard's device wasn't using its proper random market at all. It hadn't been for about 5 years.
Instead, it fakes it using the chip serial number and a timer, both of which are deterministic. And so, instead of guessing a seed phrase out of every atom in the universe, you could just loop through all possible combinations of serial numbers and timer values and come away with everyone's keys.
Everyone's keys. And Farship had the attackers taking around a hundred million dollars worth of Bitcoins from more than 7,000 wallets. So, the lesson's simple. The dice matters more than the box they come in. So, who did it?
Nobody's been named, and there are three explanations doing the rounds. Suspect one is the lone cracker. That's Cubics' own version. Weak seeds and attacker who worked out how they were made, and a list run through in under 2 hours. It fits the clock clue and the Apple clue.
Suspect two is the listener. That's slow miss theory. Someone watching the wallet's messages and working the seeds out. It's been shown to work in a test, but nobody's shown that's how this one was done. Suspect three is the inside job.
A few people on X shouted that. One joking it was done to make the price chart look right. I've seen no evidence for that at all, so treat it as pub talk. And then there's the founder. He posted on the 19th of October that it was, his own words, just a problem with the random number generator in a wallet.
And that these things happen in crypto on a daily basis. But if it was your 10 grand, you wouldn't want it put quite like that, would you? But here's the twist that split Qubic holders down the middle. To stop the thief cashing out, the computers halted the whole blockchain. Nothing moved for anyone.
And while everything was frozen, the coins that never left Qubic got moved into a lock box for their owners, which is clever, right? Then on the 20th of October, the network came back on. The computer said yes to the recovery, and Qubic said the first coins had gone back to their owners. And if you were hit, you've got until the 1st of May, 2027 to claim. So that's a happy ending, right?
Well, sort of. A news site called Crypto Noticias said it showed something worse than a kill switch. The 676 validators decided what happened to people's money, and victims were waiting on their permission. And they've got a point, because a chain that can stop to catch a thief can stop for other reasons, too. I'm not saying Qubic did wrong here, because it froze most of the money and is handing it back to its owners.
But whatever coin you hold, it's worth knowing who can press pause on it. So let's split the facts from the gossip. What we know for sure from Qubic itself is 1,404 wallets, an hour and 44 minutes, weak randomness, and a fix. What we don't know is who the thief is, exactly how they found the seeds, and who's behind that MEXC account. Qubic says a full technical report will follow, and until then, everything about the who is a guess, mine included.
And I'm not going to address Qubic up, either, for you. On the 18th of October, one chart watcher had it down about 40% from its October high, at about 45 cents for a million coins. And Qubic told anyone who'd made a wallet on its web wallet before the fix to treat it as insecure, even if nothing was taken. So, plenty of holders have to set up new wallets and move everything across. And there's a second thief in nearly every story like this.
Qubic warned that nobody from Qubic will ever message you at first or ask for your seed because the fake recovery people turned up within hours and they go after folk who've been hurt once. So, what's the lesson? It's not just keep your seed safe because these people did. It's that a seed is only as good as the dice that rolled it. So, for every wallet you've got, ask three things.
What made it? A hardware gadget, an app, a page in a web browser? When did you make it? And has the company behind it ever put a warning out about how its wallets were made? And if the maker tells you to make a new one, you do it from the real app, never from a link somebody sent you.
And a lot of this comes down to knowing who to believe, doesn't it? One of our members, Robert, wrote about exactly that feeling. In a Trustpilot review nobody asked him to write, he says he used to be scared stiff of making any decision in crypto because you couldn't be 100% sure the information in front of him was right. He says that's not a problem for him anymore and that he made back what the program cost him out of his gains in a couple of months. Now, that's Robert's result.
It isn't typical and nobody can promise you the same. But inside you'll find people from all sorts of backgrounds. Plenty of them just protecting what they've built with one-to-one coaching and a weekly call with our research team. So, if you've got 50 grand or more in crypto doing nothing, the free call's waiting behind the first link in the description. So, get it done before Black Friday.
But think back to those 1,404 wallets emptied in the night at 4 and 1/2 seconds each. The thief didn't break the lock. They worked out the lock was never as strong as everyone thought. Most of the money's going home. Nobody's been named.
So, know where your wallets were born. Ignore anyone offering to get your coins back, and find out who can press pause on what you hold. So, who do you think did it? Tell me in the comments. One for the lone cracker, two for the listener, or three for the inside job.
And look, none of this is financial advice, guys. It's just my take after a lot of digging. Crypto carries risk, and what's happened before is no guarantee of what comes next. So, stick with me, subscribe, and there's a new one every day. Thanks for watching, guys.
Keep your head, stack with purpose, and I'll keep you posted.
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Education and commentary only, not financial advice. Crypto is volatile and you can lose money. Do your own research and speak to a qualified advisor before making investment decisions. Figures and quotes are as reported in the video on October 28, 2026 and may have changed since.


